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Economic value of land use for carbon sequestration: An application to the EU 
climate policy. 
 
 
Abstract:. This paper applies the replacement cost method for calculating the value of 
stochastic carbon sequestration in the EU climate policy for mitigating carbon dioxide 
emissions. Minimum costs with and without carbon sequestrations are then derived with a 
safety-first approach in a chance-constrained framework for two different scenarios; one with 
the current system for emission trading in combination with national allocation plans and one 
with a hypothetical system where all sectors trade. The theoretical results show that i) the 
value of carbon sequestration approaches zero for a high enough risk discount, ii) relatively low 
abatement cost in the trading sector curbs supply of permits on the ETS market, and iii) large 
abatement costs in the trading sector create values from carbon sequestration for meeting 
national targets. The empirical application to the EU commitment of 20% reduction in carbon 
dioxide emissions shows large variation in carbon sequestration value depending on risk 
discount and on institutional set up. Under no uncertainty, the value can correspond to 
approximately 0.45% of total GDP in EU under current policy system, but it is reduced to one 
third if all sectors are allowed to trade. The value declines drastically under conditions of 
uncertainty and approaches zero for high probabilities in achieving targets.  The allocation of 
value among countries depends on scenario; under the current system countries make gains 
from reduced costs of meeting national targets, under a sector-wide trading scheme buyers of 
permits gain from reductions in permit price and sellers make associated losses. 
Key words:  carbon sequestration, value, replacement cost method, uncertainty, safety-first,  
                    chance-constrained programming, EU emission target 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In principle, the threats of climate change due to increased carbon content in the atmosphere 
can be mitigated in two ways; by reducing carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and/or by 
increasing the uptake of carbon from the atmosphere by growing biomass, denoted carbon 
sequestration or sink. While costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions have been addressed 
and calculated since early 1990s in a large number of studies, where Nordhaus (1994) is a 
seminal contribution, there are only a few studies comparing these costs with costs of 
measures increasing carbon sequestration (e.g. Pohjola et al., 2003; Lubowski, et al., 2006, 
Bosetti et al., 2009; Michetti and Rosa, 2011; Gren et al., 2012). For example, Lubowski, et al. 
(2006) showed that approximately 1/3 of the US carbon abatement commitment would be 
achieved by forest carbon sequestration in a cost effective solution. Michetti and Rosa (2011) 
presented results where the inclusion of carbon sink could reduce cost of meeting EU 2020 CO2 
commitment in an emission trading system (ETS) by at least 25%.  
 
Despite these results, hesitations remain with respect to the inclusion of carbon sequestration 
in the EU climate policy, the main argument being the stochastic nature of carbon 
sequestration (EC, 2008). Gren et al. (2012) showed that the economic value in terms of cost 
savings approaches zero when reliability in reaching EU climate targets is if great concern. 
Similar results are obtained in Gren (2012), who accounts for uncertainty in emission reductions 
from fossil fuel and in abatement costs in addition to the stochastic carbon sink. However, both 
studies of stochastic carbon sink in the EU policy consider only actual forest sink and increases 
from conversion of arable land into forest. Undoubtedly, these sink sources are important and  
correspond to approximately 15% of forecasted emissions in 2020 (Gren et al., 2020).  
However, it might be difficult to implement carbon sink as ‘by-products’ from forestry into any  
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EU policy due to the requirement of ‘additionality’,  i.e. that the carbon sink would not have 
been implemented without the policy in question. Further, the potential for increasing sinks 
may not be of the same order of magnitude as actual carbon sink, and uncertainty in sink can 
differ among land use options. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether stochastic 
carbon sink has positive values in the EU climate change program for increases in carbon sink. 
The land uses included are increased rotation in forestry, conversion of arable land into forests, 
and changed land use practices for agricultural land. 
 
This paper applies the same approach for assessing the value of carbon sinks in climate change 
mitigation programs as Gren et al. (2012) and Gren (2012). This implies the use of the so-called 
replacement cost method for assigning values to non-market environmental goods. The basic 
principle guiding the method is that the value of the technology under investigation is 
determined by its cost savings for reaching specific environmental targets. In order to account 
for policy makers relative risk aversion with respect to non-attainment of stipulated targets the 
safety-first criterion in the framework of chance constrained programming is applied. Different 
variations of the safety-first criterion have a long tradition in economics for dealing with urgent 
targets, such as minimum food supply (e.g. Tesler, 1955; Pyle and Turnovsky, 1970; Bigman, 
1995). The suggested approach has partly been applied by Gren et al. (2012) and Gren (2012) 
for evaluating the potential of forest carbon sink in the EU ETS and national commitment 
program, and by Byström et al. (2000) and Gren (2010) for valuing ecosystems’ water cleaning 
function under stochastic conditions.  
 
Similar to several empirical studies on the evaluation of the costs of reducing carbon dioxides, 
we apply a partial equilibrium modeling framework which is based on marginal control costs for 
emission reduction and carbon sequestration in different countries (e.g., Böhringer and Löschel, 
2009).  The main contribution of this paper is the calculation of value of different land uses for  
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carbon sequestration, which extends the possibilities included in Gren et al. (2012) and Gren 
(2012).  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we describe the chance-constrained 
programming model, which is used for identifying conditions for a positive value of carbon sinks 
and determinants of the size of the value. Data sources are briefly described in section 3. 
Section 4 presents the results and the paper ends with a brief summary and some tentative 
conclusions.  
 
 
2. The model 
 
 
EU consists of i=1,..,27 countries each of which faces costs of reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
by decreasing the use of fossil fuels, f=1,..,n. In addition, atmospheric content of carbon can be 
reduced by construction of carbon sinks with s=1,..,k sink options such as sequestration in 
forest, or conversions of alternative land into forests. Each of the carbon sink options deliver 
carbon sink only with uncertainty due to climate impact on carbon sequestration  (e.g. Janssens 
et al., 2005).  
 
The countries face different regulations with regard to carbon dioxide emissions. In this paper 
we focus on two directives: the EU ETS (Official Journal, Directive 2009/29/EC) and national 
commitments (Official Journal, Decision 406/2009/EC). The EU ETS is the cornerstone of the 
EU's strategy for fighting climate change. It is the first and largest international trading system 
for carbon dioxide emissions in the world and has been in operation since 2005. In addition to 
the EU ETS, member states face individual targets expressed as reductions in percent from the 
2005 emission level, which in the following are denoted as national allocation plans (NAP).  
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When both fossil fuel reductions and carbon sinks are allowed, total emissions in each country 
from the trading, TiTr, and non-trading sectors, TiNtr, is written as initial or business as usual 
(BAU) use of fossil fuels, 'TrifT and '
Ntr
ifT minus reductions achieved by decreasing fossil fuel uses,  
Tr
ifA and 
Ntr
ifA , and by introduction of land use for carbon sinks, 
Tr
isA and 
Ntr
isA , according to  
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where  Dif  is the conversion of fossil fuel into carbon dioxide,  Fis converts land use practices into 
carbon sequestration, and Tr
is and 
Nr
is measure the uncertainties associated with carbon 
sequestration in the trading and non-trading sectors.  
 
Decision makers at the international level are assumed to apply a safety-first approach in 
reaching maximum emission target with respect to total emission in the EU ETS, 
TriTr
i
Tr TTT  . National authorities make similar decisions on achievement of the 
national allocation plans where 
iNtriNtr TT  . Both types of decision makers formulate a 
minimum probability, α and βi for EU and national authorities respectively, of achieving the 
maximum emission target, which is written as 
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In order to facilitate calculations, these constraints are rewritten in terms of deterministic 
equivalents (see e.g. Taha, 1976). This is made in the same way for both restrictions, and it is 
presented for the EU target as   
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where  Tr
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TVarTr  ,  and the term 2/1
Tr
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T
T
TrT


 shows the number of standard 
errors,  , that T  deviates from the mean. By the choice of α, there is thus a level of acceptable 
deviation, and the expression within brackets in (3’) then holds only if  
 
Tr
TT
TTrTr 
2/1  .                                                                                     (5) 
 
where   is the critical value associated with α, which is determined by the distribution of the 
random variable and the chosen level of α. The left hand side of (5) shows that reliability in 
achieving the target is obtained at a cost, which is increasing in reliability concern or higher 
probability of achieving the target, i.e. in  , and in TrT . The deterministic equivalents of the 
national targets in (3) are derived in the same way, which gives 
 
iNtr
TT
TiNtr
i
iNtr 
2/1                                                                                                               (6) 
 
Carbon dioxide emission are reduced by abatement in the trading and non-trading sectors, TrifA  
and NtTrifA respectively, and carbon sink is increased by implementation of measures in each  
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sector, Tr
isA and 
Ntr
isA . Cost functions for reductions in each fossil fuel type are written as
)( Trif
Tr
if AC  and )(
NtTr
if
Ntr
if AC , and for carbon sink management as )(
Tr
isis AC  and )(
Ntr
isis AC . It is 
thus assumed that the costs for carbon sink are the same irrespective of its use as offsets in the 
ETS of for meeting national allocation plans. All cost functions are assumed to be increasing and 
convex in their arguments. It is also assumed that the area of land suitable for different land 
uses is limited in each country according to 
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The decision problem is formulated as the choice of abatement measures that minimizes  total 
costs, which is written as   
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where 
2/1)(2 Tr



 , 
2/1)(2 iNtr
i
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
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

 , λ<0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the EU emission 
restriction in (3), φi<0 on the national target restrictions in (4), and γi on the land use 
restrictions in (5). In a competitive trading market, the equilibrium permit price is set at –λ. 
 
By comparing equations  (9) and (11) with (10) and (12)  we can derive conditions for when 
carbon sink has a  cost advantage compared to emission reduction, which occurs when the 
marginal abatement cost is lower than that of emission reduction. In a cost effective solution 
for reaching the EU ETS target, the marginal costs weighted by their impacts, i.e. the left hand 
sides of (9) and (10) divided by the expression within parentheses at the right hand sides, are 
equal and correspond to the Lagrange multiplier λ. A positive value of carbon sink then occurs 
if, at any Ais>0, the weighted marginal cost of carbon sink is lower than that of emission 
reductions, which is written as 
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According to (13), carbon sink has a cost advantage when the marginal impact on the target is 
relatively high and the sink provision cost low. The marginal target impact consists of two parts; 
reduction in expected sink and increase in variability. The latter implies a marginal risk discount, 
the level of which depends on the chosen reliability level and on the marginal impact on the 
total standard deviation. When 
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the right hand side of (13) then becomes negative. When this is not the case, the value of 
carbon sink is determined by the abatement costs for all trading sectors in the EU.   
 
The conditions for a positive value of carbon sink for meeting the national allocation plans are 
derived in a similar way, but the marginal cost of carbon sink is then compared to abatement 
costs of fossil fuel reductions within a country. Carbon sink is then of higher interest for 
meeting national allocation plans then the EU ETS target when the country in question faces 
relatively high abatement costs. This can be seen when comparing (10) and (12), and solving for 
i , which gives the optimal allocation of carbon sink for meeting EU ETS and NAP as 
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Carbon sink is used for meeting national allocation plans when the right hand side of (14) 
exceeds the left hand side. The costs of meeting NAP are then reduced more than if the sink is 
offered at the market at the equilibrium permit price of –λ. Thus, if abatement in the trading 
sector is obtained at a lower cost than in the non-trading sector carbon sink will be used for 
meeting NAP. Similar result was obtained by Gren et al. (2012).  
 
3. Data retrieval    
 
The data needs for empirical assessment consist of abatement costs for all measures, emissions 
from fossil fuel sources, and mean and variance in carbon sequestration of different land uses 
for all member states. In addition, we need forecasts on emissions in 2020 since the EU  
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commitment of 20% reductions of CO2 from the 1990 emission level is supposed to be achieved 
at the latest this year. Since the focus of this paper is on the role of carbon sinks for meeting EU 
commitments, we present data for calculations of carbon sinks and quantification of 
uncertainty in more detail than for the other classes of data.  Gren et al. (2012) give references 
to more detailed presentation of all data on abatement costs for reductions in energy-related 
emissions and calculations of emissions from different energy sources. 
 
3.1 Calculation of actual and potential carbon sink from different land uses  
 
Carbon sequestration is associated with biomass growth, which, in turn, depends on a number 
of different factors such as forest management, climate conditions and soil quality (see e.g. van 
Kooten et al. 2004). This paper makes use of the assessment presented by Janssens et al., 
(2005), which contains systematic measurement of carbon sequestration for all EU countries 
and several classes of land uses. The carbon emission intensities presented in Janssens et al. 
(2005) for forests, arable land, grassland, and peatland are used for calculating both actual and 
potential carbon sinks in the EU countries. The calculated total amount of carbon sink as 
measured in carbon dioxides equivalents (CO2e) from forests amount to 513 million of ton, but 
this is counteracted by the carbon sources provided by other land uses, see Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Allocation of existing carbon sink/source in the EU. 
Source: calculations based on data in Table A1 in appendix. 
 
 
Net carbon sink in the EU countries amounts to 262 million tons of CO2e. Arable land is the 
main carbon source. Depending on allocation of land uses, the contribution to sink/source 
among the EU countries shows a large variation, see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Allocation of existing carbon sink/source among EU countries from forests, arable  
               land, grassland, and peatland. (See Table 1 for acronyms.) 
Source: Calculations from Table A1 in appendix 
 
Countries with relatively large areas of forest and grassland provide carbon sinks where 
Germany, Spain, France, and Sweden are the largest contributors. The carbon source countries 
are Poland and Ireland, which arise from their relatively high emission intensities from arable 
land and peat land.  
 
The potential of raising the amount of total net carbon sinks includes increases in carbon sink 
rich countries and reductions in carbon source from other countries. In principle, changes in 
carbon sink compared with the baseline presented in Figures 1 and 2 can be made by increasing 
the rotation period of forests which prolongs the growth period and thereby sequestration, 
converting areas to forest, and changing land uses practices in agriculture and peat land. With 
respect to the first type of measure, Kaipanen et al. (2004) estimate that increases in carbon 
sink from European boreal forests range between 20% and 100% when the rotation period is 
increased by 20 years. The variation depends on tree species and climate region in Europe.  In 
this paper we assume that the forest sink increases by 40% when the rotation period is  
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increased by 20 years, compared with the baseline for each country presented in Figure 2. The 
lower range is chosen because of the difficult to transfer results to deciduous forests in other 
parts of Europe.  
 
According to Weiske (2007) carbon sources from arable land could be decreased by 
approximately 75-105 Mt CO2e if a range of practices are implemented, such as reduced tillage, 
better use of organic amendments, more perennial crops, improved rotations and irrigation. 
This paper applies a lower range of 30% decrease in carbon source from arable land compared 
with the baseline presented in Figure 1, and assumes this to be the same for all EU countries. 
Since much of the reductions in emission are obtained from improved management practices 
on drained peat land, specific measures on peat land are not included. Finally it is allowed for 
conversion of agriculture land into forest. Given the short period until 2020, afforestation 
requires fast-growing tree varieties to provide carbon sequestration. Assuming this can be 
accomplished, the corresponding net effect on carbon sequestration per unit of land area is 
calculated as the difference in emission coefficients between the land uses (see Table A1 in 
appendix).  Given all assumptions the total change in carbon sink corresponds to a net increase 
of approximately 407 Mt CO2e, which is allocated on the different land uses for entire Europe 
as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Potential increase of carbon sinks in EU for different land uses as change from the  
                 baseline in Figure 1. 
Source:   Table A2 in appendix. 
 
Undoubtedly, the main increase in carbon sink is obtained from increased rotation period in 
actual forestry, which accounts for one half of the total potential increases. The allocation of 
potential carbon sink increase among countries indicates that almost half of the potential is 
found in four countries; Germany, France, Poland, and Romania, see Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Carbon sink change potential in EU countries a change from the baseline in Figure 
               2, Mt CO2e. (See Table 1 for acronyms.) 
Source: Table A2 in the appendix. 
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With respect to restrictions on the total area available and on areas of agriculture land that can 
be converted to forests, it is assumed that the total area of land uses cannot be changed. For all 
EU countries, land use is affected by a number of common policies, such as the common 
agricultural policy and by national interests for food security, rural development, and 
countryside amenities. However, country-specific investigations of maximum conversion of 
agriculture land in a short time perspective are not available, and we therefore follow Gren et 
al. (2012) and assume that the maximum conversion of agriculture land into forests is 20% of 
the actual arable land area in all countries.  
 
Carbon sink for each of the land uses presented in Figure 4 is associated with a risk, which is 
measured as their variances. Such data are obtained from Janssens et al (2005) who report 
standard deviations in carbon sink for each land use. Because of lack of data it is assumed that 
there is no co-variation in emissions and carbon sequestration among countries and the total 
risk is then calculated as the sum of all country variances. Table 1 shows the calculated 
emission, and allocations of risk in carbon sink. 
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Table 1: CO2 emission from fossil fuel (thousand tons), carbon sink as share of 
               forecasted emission in 2020 per country and in total, and allocation of risk in total  
               carbon sink when all measures are implemented. 
Acronyms and countries Emissions in 2006 
from fossil fuel per 
country and in total, 
kton CO2e 1 
Max share in % of 
potential sink of 2020 
emissions per country 
and in total2 
Allocation of 
total EU sink risk, 
in %3 
AT  Austria 69675 0.18 1.07 
BE  Belgium 128396 0.01 0.09 
BG  Bulgaria 46934 0.24 0.59 
CY  Cyprus 8441 0.00 0.00 
CZ  Check Republic 117617 0.11 1.16 
DE  Germany 816432 0.08 32.01 
DK  Denmark 60944 0.23 0.34 
EE Estonia 14851 0.32 0.24 
ES  Spain 355472 0.03 6.86 
FI  Finland 67425 0.32 1.57 
FR  France 383634 0.12 13.14 
GR  Greece 103986 0.03 0.05 
HU  Hungary 53547 0.28 2.59 
IE  Ireland 47363 0.06 0.15 
IT  Italy 446523 0.05 3.82 
LT  Lithuania 13149 0.65 1.12 
LU Luxembourg 12383 0.01 0.00 
LV  Latvia 8788 0.83 0.67 
MT  Malta 2709 0.00 0.00 
NL Netherlands 225081 0.02 0.22 
PL  Poland 310308 0.13 15.92 
PT  Portugal 58795 0.07 0.37 
RO  Romania 93080 0.35 11.53 
SE  Sweden 52514 0.42 2.98 
SI  Slovenia 15613 0.25 0.14 
SK  Slovakia 35411 0.32 1.05 
UK  United Kingdom 567793 0.02 2.32 
 Total 4116864 0.10 100 
   Source: 1) Gren et al., (2012) Table 1; 2) Coefficient of variation calculated from the data  in  
                      Table A1 in appendix. 
.  
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In total, maximum increase in carbon sequestration compared to the baseline in Figure 1 
amounts to approximately 10% of total calculated forecasted emissions in the target year 2020. 
This is considerable when comparing with the target reduction of 20% in 1990 emission which 
requires a reduction of 24% in forecasted emissions (Gren et al., 2012). For several countries, 
the potential carbon sink corresponds to at least 30% of the forecasted emissions in 2020. 
 
In addition there is a need to describe the uncertainty with respect to type of probability 
distribution. The choice will affect the level of the discounting     and 
i  in equations (5)-(6) 
in Section 2. A standard practice is to assume a normal probability distribution and  is then a 
standard number such that 



 df )(  , where   is the standardized distribution of the sink 
and f( ) is the probability density function for   (see e.g., Taha, 1976). This approach is 
frequently applied in the literature on policy instruments for stochastic water pollution 
(McSweeny and Shortle, 1990; Shortle, 1990; Byström, et al., 2000; Gren, 2010). In this paper 
we follow the practice of using the normal probability distribution. For alternative 
specifications, see McCarl and Spreen (2010), Gren et al. (2012) and Gren (2012).  It is also 
assumed that the assigned probabilities are the same for all countries and for the trading 
market. 
 
3.2 Carbon sequestration and emission reduction costs 
 
The carbon sink can increase, and hence incur costs, by changing timber management and the 
allocation of land from low- to high-sink land intensities (see van Kooten et al., 2005, for a 
review and meta-analysis of carbon sequestration options and costs). Ideally, cost functions for 
providing carbon sequestration would be available for each country, showing the allocation of 
sequestration by different options, which minimizes total costs for each sequestration level.  
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Unfortunately, such cost functions are not available. Relatively simple estimates are therefore 
used for assessing costs of increasing the rotation period in forests, converting arable land to 
forests, and reducing carbon dioxide emissions from arable and peat land. Costs for increasing 
rotation period are defined as the associated decreases in optimal profits. They are determined 
by a number of different factors, such as expected prices on timber and saw logs, discount rate, 
and biomass growth. According to Kaipanen et al., (2007) there is only minor impact on profits 
from prolonged rotation period. However, a delay in harvesting by 20 years impacts profits as 
measured in present terms, the magnitude of which depends on the discount rate. In this paper 
it is assumed in the reference case that profits, which are measured as incomes from forestry 
obtained in UNECE (2012), decrease by 20%. Incomes from forestry per ha in different countries 
are shown in Table A4 in appendix.  
 
Similarly, there are no data on costs of changed practices on arable land in the EU. Enkvist et al. 
(2007) report a range in cost between 15 and 50 Euro/ton CO2e reduction depending on which 
practices are implemented. Changes in manure treatment are relatively inexpensive and 
conversion of land use for energy production expensive. These costs are related to the profit 
from arable land under business as usual conditions, and will therefore differ between the EU 
countries. When measuring these profits as rents for arable land, they vary between 33 and 466 
Euro/ha (see Table A4 in appendix). The higher cost for reducing carbon emissions reported by 
Enkvist et al. (2007) would correspond to approximately 25% of these profits. Due to lack of 
better data, it is assumed that this percentage on profit reduction is the same for all EU 
countries, and, hence, generates constant marginal costs for reducing emission from arable 
land in each country. Costs of converting arable land to forests are obtained from Gren et al. 
(2012), where the costs are calculated as associated decreases in producer surplus. These costs 
are derived from estimated linear supply functions of agriculture land, which are calculated 
based on point estimates of rental value and supply of agriculture land and the elasticity of 0.2.  
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Data on costs of emission reductions are obtained from Gren et al., (2012),  which are 
calculated as corresponding decreases in consumer surplus derived from energy demand 
functions for three main classes of energy products: oil products (heavy fuel oil, light fuel 
oil/heating oil, gasoline, diesel, and jet kerosene), coal (hard coal and lignite), and natural gas. 
These demand functions are, in turn, assumed to be linear and are calculated by means of data 
on input price elasticities, price level, and input use for the year 2006. Separate demand 
functions are calculated for three different sectors; the industry sector, the power sector, and 
the households.  
 
4. Results 
 
The value of carbon sequestration is calculated as the difference in total abatement costs with 
and without the inclusion of the sequestration options. Calculations are made for the EU 
independent commitment of reducing total emission by 20% in 2020 under assumptions of two 
different institutional settings. One is the program from 2005 which is modeled in Section 2 
with a market for emission trading (ETS) and national allocation plans. The other is a 
hypothetical setting, which is a plausible future scenario, where all sector are allowed to trade.  
Given the large number of simplifying assumptions presented in Section 3 in particular with 
respect to costs and effects of the included land use changes, Monte Carlo simulations are 
carried out for ranges in these parameter values in order to investigate the implications of 
parameter uncertainty for the results. GAMS’ solver Conopt2 is used for all calculations (Brooke 
et al., 1998). 
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4.1 Results in the reference case 
 
As shown in Section 2, the higher the abatement cost without carbon sink and the lower cost of 
carbon sink, the higher is the value of the sink. This is the reason for the relatively high value 
under the system with EU ETS and national allocation plans, denoted EU2020, compared to a 
system where all sectors trade, denoted Market, see Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Value of carbon sink for different probabilities of achieving the target of reducing  
              emissions by 20% in 2020, and EU2020 (ETS and NAP) and Market (ETS for all  
              sectors) 
 
The total cost for reaching the EU2020 under deterministic and no sink cases is found for the 
probability of 0.5 for the normal distribution; it amounts to 98 billion Euro/year which 
corresponds to approximately 0.9 % of total GDP in the EU countries in 2006. The associated 
allowance price is 46 Euro/ton CO2 emission. When we compare these estimates with the 
results of other studies, we note that they fall in the upper level of the range (e.g. Capros et al., 
2008; Stankeviciute et al., 2008; Böhringer et al., 2009). The total estimated costs in Capros et 
al. (2008), who used a general equilibrium model of the EU countries, range between 75 and 
111 billion Euro/year, which correspond to approximately 0.6 % and 1 % respectively of the 
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 sum of GDP in all EU countries in 2006.  When all sectors trade, the total cost of achieving the 
20% target is reduced to about one half, to 46 billions of Euro, which is a result in line with the 
literature (see Börhinger et al. 2009 for a review). 
 
The difference in costs for achieving targets under the no sink cases between the institutional 
settings explains corresponding difference in the value of carbon sink. The cost of carbon sink is 
the same regardless if it is used at the market or for meeting NAP. The costs for most countries 
are higher under EU2020 because of the allocation of NAP where marginal abatement costs 
differ in the non-trading sectors among the countries and exceed the allowance price on the 
trading market. They therefore use most of the carbon sink for meeting the NAP, and the value 
of carbon sink is almost three times as large as when there is an overall trading market. 
However, under both institutional settings, the value declines for higher reliability levels 
because of the risk discount, and approaches zero when the chosen probability for achieving 
the targets is 0.95 
 
However, the value is unevenly distributed among the countries under both institutional 
settings, but in different ways. Under EU2020 most countries make gains from reducing costs of 
meeting NAP, and relatively little sink is offered on the ETS. This is shown in the price of ETS 
that is reduced from Euro 42/tCO2 in the no sink case under EU2020 to Euro 40/tCO2 with sink 
and a p=0.8, and to Euro 35/tCO2 under deterministic conditions when p=0.5 . Then, a few 
countries, Germany, France, Italy, and Sweden, account for almost one half of the total value of 
carbon sinks, see Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Allocation of values of carbon sink among countries net after trade under EU2020  
               when probability of achieving the target is 0.5 (p=0.5) and 0.8 (p=0.8). (See Table 1 for  
               acronyms). 
 
As shown in Figure 6, the value of carbon sink is reduced considerably for some countries when 
reliability is of concern. The overall reduction in the value is approximately 55%, which also 
corresponds to the reduction in value for Germany, Italy, and France. However, for other 
countries, such as Sweden and Spain, the value shows a more drastic decline which is due to 
the risk discount. For Spain, the value is eliminated because of the relatively high risk in 
reducing emissions from arable land.  
 
The pattern of value allocations among countries is changed when there is a market for all 
sectors. Gains are then made by lower abatement costs which reduce demand for permits on 
the market. The price is then reduced by approximately 50% when p=0.5, from approximately 
55 Euro/tCO2 to 27 Euro/tCO2. Countries purchasing permits gain from this price decrease while  
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countries with relatively low cost options for reducing emissions make losses from lower sales 
prices, see Figure 7.  
 
 
Figure 7: Allocation of values of carbon sink among EU countries net after trade when all  
                sectors trade  and the probability of achieving the target is 0.5 (p=0.5) and 0.8 (p=0.8).  
               (See Table 1 for acronyms). 
 
The level of values of carbon sink is considerably lower when all sectors trade compared to 
EU2020 because of the lower cost of meeting the overall target. Countries making the largest 
gains from the lower price of permits when p=0.5 are Italy, UUK, France, Spain and the 
Netherlands. For some countries, the value of carbon sink is negative; Czech Republic, Estonia, 
and Poland. The equilibrium permit price increases to 41 Euro/tCO2 when p=0.8, which 
increases the value of carbon sinks from permit sales for Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. 
 
4.2 Monte Carlo simulations 
 
The results presented in Section 4.1 rest on several simplifying assumption with respect to 
impacts of  increased rotation in forests and of arable land use practices, and associated costs.  
Monte Carlo simulations are therefore carried out where calculations of values are made for a  
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combination of 100  random numbers within ranges for these variables, which are presented in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Ranges in impact and costs of increased forest rotation and arable land use  
               practices 
 
Variable                                              Range 
Carbon sink of forest rotation, in % of actual sink from forest (Table A1) 10 – 80 
Decrease in emissions from arable land use change, in % from actual 15 – 50 
emission (Table A1) 
Cost of forest rotation,  % of factor income (Table A4)                    0 – 100 
Cost of arable land change, % of rent (Table A4)                 5 - 100  
       
 
 
Calculations are carried out for EU2020 and when all sectors trade, but only for risk neutrality 
when p=0.5 (for a normal probability distribution), because of the relatively high carbon sink 
values in this case. It can also be argued that the probabilistic constraints account for the 
uncertainty in carbon sink. 
 
Given the ranges displayed in Table 2, the total value of carbon sink for all EU countries can vary 
between 3003 and 57555 billions of Euro, and the average value amounts to 31076 billions of 
Euro under an EU2020 policy, see Table 3. Thus, in spite of zero risk discount, the value can be 
quite low which occurs when the impact of increased rotation is small and the cost is relatively 
high.  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for value of carbon sink total EU and for different  
                countries under EU2020, n=100 (See Table 1 for acronyms). 
 Average, 
billions of 
Euro 
Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of 
variation 
Min value, 
billions of 
Euro 
Max value, 
billions of 
Euro 
Total EU 31975.57 
 
15033.64 
 
0.47 3003 57553 
Countries:      
AT 957.80 655.53 0.68 1.57 2251.10 
BE 82.99 95.99 1.16 0.61 341.64 
BG 300.09 143.25 0.48 10.55 554.84 
CY 2.24 1.94 0.87 0.33 8.18 
CZ 30.71 66.98 2.18 -109.80 294.13 
DE 4711.62 2554.01 0.54 0.11 9041.75 
DK 1126.31 433.21 0.38 133.36 1707.61 
EE 96.36 49.10 0.51 12.98 212.39 
ES 2466.90 1574.98 0.64 0.21 5709.51 
FI 47.90 96.11 2.01 0.51 418.22 
FR 1900.78 1722.29 0.91 4.56 5845.12 
GR 7.33 27.42 3.74 -0.14 150.29 
HU 1188.56 458.82 0.39 124.46 1778.96 
IE 448.36 212.72 0.47 24.52 827.46 
IT 4870.63 2447.63 0.50 5.60 9500.51 
LT 561.93 162.12 0.29 112.95 815.22 
LU 15.58 2.58 0.17 11.72 22.25 
LV 1380.16 229.73 0.17 695.27 1723.86 
MT 0.82 0.84 1.02 -0.03 3.42 
NL 167.10 144.53 0.86 1.90 535.16 
PL 926.00 594.75 0.64 0.20 2066.52 
PT 11.17 52.46 4.69 -2.59 287.03 
RO 2654.45 489.06 0.18 1382.65 3345.10 
SE 4283.08 1938.10 0.45 19.27 7240.80 
SI 589.12 136.35 0.23 208.36 793.71 
SK 823.03 223.38 0.27 240.36 1158.41 
UK 1704.57 902.65 0.53 17.20 3682.89 
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The average value is positive for all countries, and Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden and Romania 
accounts for almost 2/3 of the total average value. All these countries but Romania make 
considerable gains from less expensive achievement of their NAP. The low cost of increased 
forest rotation in Romania (see Table A4 in appendix) generates gains from supplying carbon 
sink at the trading market. However, the variability in values, measured as the coefficient of 
variation, differ between the countries, being quite small for Latvia and Romania and high for 
Portugal and Greece. The low opportunity cost of land conversion in Latvia and low cost of 
increased forest rotation period in Romania generate incomes from sales of permits also under 
relatively unfavorable conditions. For other countries, these conditions determine whether 
carbon sink is used for meeting NAP or offered in the market, which creates larger variations in 
values. 
 
When all sectors trade, the pattern with respect to winners and losers from carbon sink 
presented in Figure 7 remains the same; buyers of permits make gains and sellers make losses,  
see Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for value of carbon sink total EU and for different  
                countries under market for all sectors. (See Table 1 for aronyms). 
 Average  Standard 
deviation 
Coefficient 
of  variation 
Min Max 
 
     Total EU 10539.87 6568.32 0.62 111 25956
Countries: 
     AT 212.11 157.54 0.74 -52.01 706.46
BE 460.44 268.42 0.58 6.36 929.50 
BG 43.07 37.55 0.87 -56.45 105.87 
CY 46.85 25.57 0.55 0.69 87.00 
CZ -144.03 114.59 0.80 -384.67 145.02 
DE 606.94 832.65 1.37 -518.10 3181.43 
DK 95.68 98.90 1.03 -64.72 330.69 
EE -59.48 57.03 -0.96 -180.32 11.99 
ES 1059.26 602.32 0.57 15.68 2264.28 
FI 14.97 61.72 4.12 -259.92 151.88 
FR 1615.84 931.52 0.58 23.70 3609.98 
GR 210.87 132.80 0.63 2.06 484.11 
HU 360.35 208.24 0.58 2.17 686.76 
IE 213.34 120.47 0.56 3.42 429.08 
IT 2095.38 1236.87 0.59 30.26 4608.32 
LT 2.88 108.87 37.75 -197.65 193.06 
LU 83.36 45.52 0.55 1.25 155.82 
LV -2.18 119.02 54.47 -303.60 209.65 
MT 16.34 8.97 0.55 0.23 30.53 
NL 1015.99 598.05 0.59 12.23 2072.38 
PL -668.21 441.95 0.66 -1485.57 -8.71 
PT 206.05 114.15 0.55 2.04 395.47 
RO 544.18 267.44 0.49 -243.88 897.22 
SE 207.96 182.19 0.88 -217.99 513.82 
SI 73.12 67.72 0.93 -71.54 180.00 
SK 280.80 144.92 0.52 -190.15 421.01 
UK 1700.33 1055.70 0.62 26.50 3837.05 
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It is interesting to note that, for Poland, even the maximum value of carbon sink is negative 
because of the decline in permit price. Without sink option, this country make larger gains from 
offering permits at the market due to the relatively low abatement cost for reducing fossil fuels. 
For other countries, such as Italy and UK, the results show no negative values because they are 
always buyers of permits and gain from the lower equilibrium prices compared with a market 
without carbon sink option. It can also be noted that volatility in values increase for countries 
being sellers at the market and relying on carbon sinks, such as Latvia and Lithuania,  because of 
the fluctuating equilibrium permit prices. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper analyzed and quantified the value of increasing carbon sinks as a climate change 
mitigation option in the current EU climate policy with a combination of emission trading (ETS) 
and national allocation plans, and a potential system with one market for all sectors. The  
replacement cost method was applied which measures the value as the difference in costs for 
achieving given targets without carbon sink when only reductions from fossil fuel use are 
included with the costs when carbon sinks are included. Three options for increasing carbon 
sinks were included; increased rotation in forests, afforestation of arable land, and changed 
land use practices on arable land. The theoretical analysis, which builds on a safety-first 
approach where total costs for achieving emission targets are minimized under probabilistic  
constraints, shows that carbon sink is not included in a cost effective solution for high enough 
risk discount. It was also shown that the allocation of carbon sink for meeting national targets 
and the EU ETS target depends on the relation between marginal abatement costs in the 
trading and non-trading sectors. When costs are relatively high for the non-trading sector, 
which is the case for many EU countries, carbon sink values arise from reduction in costs for 
meeting the national allocation plans.  
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The empirical application to the EU commitment of 20% CO2 reduction to be achieved in 2020 
showed that, the value of all carbon sink options can vary between 0 and 40 Billions of Euro 
depending on reliability concern and institutional framework. The value is largest under current 
EU system with national allocation plans and ETS because of the significant cost savings when 
the sink can used to reduce costs for meeting the currently expensive national targets. 
However, the value decreases for increased reliability concern and approaches zero when the 
assigned probability of achieving the targets exceeds 0.9. The value of carbon sink is also lower 
when all sectors are allowed to trade because costs for meeting targets without carbon 
sequestraion is lower in that case than under the current system. The allocations of carbon sink 
values among countries differ for the two institutional settings. Under current EU trading 
system countries with carbon sink options, such as Germany and Sweden, make gains from 
reduced cost for achieving national targets. When all sectors trade, countries purchasing 
permits, like Italy and UK, make the largest gains because of the reduction in equilibrating 
permit price from the introduction of carbon sinks. On the other hand, sellers of permits then 
face negative values of carbon sink where Poland is a prominent example,  
 
Admittedly, the results presented in this paper rest on a number of simplifying assumptions. 
The most challenging data needs have been to find estimates of effects and costs of different 
carbon sink options. Although there is relatively much information on current land use and 
carbon sink or source, there is only scattered investigation of measures increasing carbon sink 
or reducing carbon releases. Monte Carlo simulations were therefore carried out for ranges of 
impacts and costs of increased forest rotation and changes arable land use practices, which 
showed great variation in carbon sink values. The simulations were carried out without any risk  
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discount, and even in this case the sink value could be very low, but also very high, depending 
on impacts and costs of the measures. This calls for more investigations of impacts and costs, 
preferably in the same study. Although there are some studies estimating impacts of changed 
land use practices, they usually don’t contain any cost estimates. Furthermore, there is little 
quantification of uncertainty in impacts. 
 
Other simplifications were associated with the calculation or risk and concern of risk in different 
countries. Level of concern about achievement of emission targets and beliefs with respect to 
risk in carbon sinks relative to other measures determine the value of carbon sink. This points 
to the need of careful analyses and quantification of uncertainty extending beyond the 
simplifications made in this paper. Availability of data which allow for the relaxation of 
assumptions made with respect to zero co-variation among measures and countries may either 
enforce or counter act our empirical results. For example, a positive co-variation between 
carbon sink and carbon emissions from fossil fuels reduces total risk and, hence, increases the 
value of carbon sink. The sink capacity is then high when carbon emissions are large and forest 
sink acts as a hedging device. Another limitation of the study is the neglect of transaction cost, 
which is regarded as a particular disadvantage of carbon sink due to the monitoring difficulties 
(e.g. Antle et al., 2003; Antinori and Sathaye 2007; Sohngen, 2009).  This is partly accounted for 
in the risk discount of carbon sink used in the paper. Improved monitoring is likely to reduce the  
uncertainty and thereby the risk discount.  
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 Appendix: Tables 
 
Table A1: Carbon emission intensities and coverage of land use in EU countries.  (See Table 1 
for acronyms.) 
 Carbon emission intensities, tC/ha1; 
Forest     Arable    Grassland  Peat  
                land                            land 
Coverage of land, 1000ha: 
Forest2    Arable2  Grassland2  Peat 3         Total 
                land                             land 
AT 2.08 -0.42 0.59 6.66 3620 1375 1854 126 8387 
BE 0.62 -0.2 0.47 -2778.2 621 840 528 10 3053 
BG 1.19 -0.43 0.2 -666.00 4076 3053 2031 5 11100 
CY       0.00 116 93 48 1 925 
CZ 1.5 -0.79 0.27 -3.82 2593 2626 970 1445 7887 
DE 2.13 -0.59 0.49 -128.02 10799 11890 5106 1785 35705 
DK 3.14 -0.63 0.24 -1034.40 476 2478 241 25 4310 
EE 0.7 -2.36 0.25 -144.52 2252 556 204 820 4523 
ES 0.32 -0.09 0.52 0.00 14191 12482 12634 20 50536 
FI 0.39 -0.8 1.87 -43.09 22146 2266 68 10044 33815 
FR 0.87 -0.33 0.31 -70.93 16384 21144 11039 542 54919 
GR 0.1 -0.38 0.22 -119.96 6560 2072 1412 55 13196 
HU 1.93 -0.73 0.26 -583.72 1806 4493 1209 102 9303 
IE 0.81 -0.2 0.24 -284.77 554 1153 3114 1301 7030 
IT 0.85 -0.44 0.41 -2909.30 11261 7352 5906 29 30132 
LT 1.23 -1.47 0.12 -84.71 2030 1835 862 185 6530 
LU 1.27 -0.18 0.3 -785.63   61 70 3 259 
LV 1.08 -1.55 0.15 -126.93 2929 1188 652 402 6459 
MT       0.00   8 1 1 32 
NL 1.68 -0.51 0.42 -548.03 479 1042 833 321 3735 
PL 1.11 -0.75 0.38 -544.70 8991 11757 3658 1504 31268 
PT 0.47 -0.7 -0.1 -680.82 3476 1186 2500 27 9191 
RO 1.99 -0.54 0.28 -80.81 6755 8820 4839 59 23839 
SE 0.48 -1.07 0.4 1.71 27947 2646 90 10502 44847 
SI 2.46 -0.33 0.12 56.31 1174 174 324 18 2027 
SK 3.25 -0.64 0.55 -61.29 1932 1343 554 56 4903 
UK 1.04 -0.3 0.52 -122.14 2494 5492 5736 5496 24410 
1) Janssens et al., 2005; 2) Gren et al., 2012, 3) Montanarella, 2006 
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Table A2: Potential changes in carbon sinks from alternative land uses,  Mt CO2e. (See Table 1  
                  for acronyms.) 
 Increased 
rotation by 20 
years1 
Changed arable 
land use 
practises2 
Afforestation3 Total 
AT 11.05 0.64 2.52 14.21 
BE 0.57 0.18 0.51 1.26 
BG 7.12 1.45 3.63 12.2 
CY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
CZ 5.71 2.28 4.41 12.4 
DE 33.77 7.72 23.74 65.23 
DK 2.19 1.72 6.86 10.77 
EE 2.31 1.44 1.25 5 
ES 6.67 1.24 3.76 11.67 
FI 12.68 2.00 1.98 16.66 
FR 20.92 7.68 18.62 47.22 
GR 0.96 0.87 0.73 2.56 
HU 5.12 3.61 8.77 17.5 
IE 0.66 0.25 0.85 1.76 
IT 14.05 3.56 6.96 24.57 
LT 3.67 2.97 3.64 10.28 
LU 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.07 
LV 4.64 2.03 2.29 8.96 
MT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 
NL 1.18 0.59 1.67 3.44 
PL 14.65 9.71 16.05 40.41 
PT 2.40 0.91 1.02 4.33 
RO 19.73 5.24 16.38 41.35 
SE 19.69 3.12 3.01 25.82 
SI 4.24 0.06 0.36 4.66 
SK 9.22 0.95 3.83 14 
UK 3.81 1.81 5.40 11.02 
Total 207.01 62.04 138.3 407.35 
1) Kaipanen et al. (2004), 2) Wieske (2007), 3) Difference in sink/source emission  
intensities between forest and arable land in Table A1 
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Table A3; Standard deviations in tC ha-1 . (See Table 1 for acronyms.) 
 Forest Arable land Grassland Peatland 
AT 0.83 0.30 1.15 0.67 
BE 0.25 0.72 0.72 15.27 
BG 0.45 0.19 0.38 22.20 
CY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CZ 0.60 0.66 0.54 0.05 
DE 0.85 0.65 0.45 0.60 
DK 0.43 0.40 0.46 25.86 
EE 0.28 1.67 0.49 0.72 
ES 0.13 0.43 0.20 25.27 
FI 0.16 0.48 21.38 0.20 
FR 0.35 0.21 0.23 1.01 
GR 0.04 0.22 0.18 2.40 
HU 0.77 0.52 0.49 0.91 
IE 0.33 0.30 1.26 1.40 
IT 0.34 0.38 0.15 10.39 
LT 0.49 1.12 0.25 0.35 
LU N/A 0.84 0.46 4.32 
LV 0.43 1.24 0.29 0.64 
MT N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NL 0.67 0.75 1.03 2.68 
PL 0.45 0.60 0.74 2.70 
PT 0.19 1.01 0.18 3.40 
RO 0.80 0.46 0.56 4.04 
SE 0.19 0.29 16.44 0.04 
SI 0.98 0.55 0.23 1.13 
SK 1.30 0.55 1.10 0.88 
UK 0.41 0.46 0.85 0.58 
Source: Calculated from Janssens et al. (2005) and allocation of land in Table A1 
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Table A4: Rents for arable land and factor incomes from forestry, Euro/ha. (See Table 1 for  
                 acronyms.) 
 Rent for arable land1 Factor incomes from 
forestry2 
AT 456 515 
BE 466 300 
BG 100 53 
CY 617 1047 
CZ 33 309 
DE 456 332 
DK 456 348 
EE 33 72 
ES 176 99 
FI 175 264 
FR 176 236 
GR 61 1043 
HU 61 104 
IE 183 1084 
IT 176 150 
LT 33 120 
LU 466 310 
LV 33 1205 
MT 176 150 
NL 466 310 
PL 61 1205 
PT 176 567 
RO 100 536 
SE 105 187 
SI 33 144 
SK 33 117 
UK 173 108 
Sources: 1) Gren et al., (2012), Supplementary material, Table S2, 2) Factor and entrepreneur 
incomes from UNECE 2012; 3) assumed the same as in Hungary; 4) assumed the same as in UK; 
5) assumed the same as in Lithuania; 6) assumed the same as in Bulgaria; 7) assumed the same 
as in Greece. 
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